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Introduction 
Current U.S. counter-terrorism policy deals with terrorists in a somewhat rational fashion.  
However, the ideology of terrorists has been characterized in a U.S. Government report as 
involving “oppression, violence, and hate”1.  These ambiguous terms share text with more 
specific irrational reasons for terrorist activities.  In the same report, experts state that terrorists 
hold “a false belief that the United States is the cause of most problems affecting Muslims today, 
our enemies seek to expel Western power and influence from the Muslim world and establish 
regimes that rule according to a violent and intolerant distortion of Islam”2.  Furthermore, the 
report continues by stating “[f]or our terrorist enemies, violence is not only justified, it is 
necessary and even glorified – judged the only means to achieve a world vision darkened by 
hate, fear and oppression”3.  Moreover, they describe terrorists as having a “distorted and violent 
view of the world”4.  
 If policy were derived from the above phrases, which depict an irrational terrorist foe, our 
military, local law enforcement, and security organizations may have to alter operations to 
combat these groups.  Yet despite the seemingly irrational drive depicted by the United States, 
our policies reflect a rational actor possibly funded by a rational state.  It may be that terrorist 
groups are rational and have rational reasons for their conflict with the United States.  But even if 
their reasons are rational, that does not mean terrorist beliefs are justified or correct.  The United 
States has an interest in overcoming these opponents because they are a threat to Americans and 
possibly the world.  Therefore, accepting terrorists as enemies is justified, but accepting them as 
irrational enemies is not.   
Counter-terrorism policy in a democracy is plagued by one ailment: security and personal 
freedom are opposing needs5.  Citizens expect terrorists to be dissuaded from attacking innocent 
civilians if civil society can implement security measures that prevent terrorists from planning 
and implementing an event.  Simultaneously, sectors of the military, the government, and society 
want to punish terrorists.  Citizens want the terrorists permanently stopped and the planning of 
future attacks prevented.  This creates tension between due process, individual rights, and 
general security because the most effective methods of attaining security are often the most 
personally intrusive methods.  This constrains counter-terrorism policy and belabors civil rights6.  
                                                 
Jibey Asthappan is a Ph.D. candidate in American University’s Justice, Law and Society program.  Six years of 
military service in the field of counter-terrorism is the impetus for his research and his drive to inspire effective 
counter-terrorism policy.   
1  Whitehouse (2006). “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. “September 2006 available at http://www. 
Globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/natonal/nsct_sep2006.pdf 
2 Ibid, p. 5. 
3 Ibid, p. 5. 
4 Ibid, p. 6. 
5 Perl, R. “Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Congressional Research Service. (2003) 
6 Ibid.  
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Under such constraints facilities, such as the Guantanamo Bay, become necessary in order to 
protect citizens.   
Free from law designed to prosecute far different criminals, these facilities are criticized 
for their lack of prisoner civil rights.  Designed for simply prosecution of terrorists, these centers 
also become the center of complex legal matters.  For example, not all detainees desire to return 
to their country.  Uighur Muslims from a North-West province of China do not wish to return to 
China for fear of retribution.  Reports insist that these detainees, if released in China, will face 
torture and/or death.  Although eligible to apply for asylum in the United States, these detainees 
have not expressed desire for refuge.  Instead the U.S. has been forced to maintain their detainee 
status and allow these Muslims to habitat in Guantanamo until provisions have been made7.  This 
example highlights the need for counter-terrorism policy to do more than address the symptoms 
of terrorism; future policy must focus on preventing terrorism.  If policy fails to identify and 
remedy root causes of terrorism the future is likely to have increasing numbers of complex civil 
rights and legal dilemmas. 
 This study, in an effort to uncover root reasons for terrorism, will delve into the issue of 
terrorism by testing if economic, social, and political factors have an effect on terrorism.  It is the 
intention of this study to suggest policies that address the source of terrorist motivations rather 
than the symptoms.  Using data from RAND and the World Bank that spans 12 years8, the 
researcher uses a negative binomial time series analysis to answer several hypotheses probing the 
relationship of political, social, and economic institutions’ effect on terrorist incidents. 
Establishing that terrorism is a rational behavior is significant to the discussion; it is only 
when we prove that terrorism is rational that policy can be effective.  That is, if terrorism is 
irrational, counter-terrorism policy will be ineffective.  Therefore, this article will begin with a 
discussion about the rationality of terrorism.  Previous research will then be reviewed that 
attempts to measure the effect of political, social and economic factors.  Weaknesses and 
strengths of each study will be discussed.  The current study will then be introduced including 
methodology, data and findings.  Finally, the discussion and conclusion will highlight important 
findings of the study and suggest policy implications.   
 
Terrorists as Rational Actors 
Simply stated, rational choice theory purports that “crimes are broadly the result of 
rational choices based on analyses of anticipated costs and benefits” 9 .  Therefore, in this 
proposal’s application, terrorists seek to reduce costs and maximize the benefits.  The costs for a 
terrorist may be the group or team’s apprehension prior to the incident, a premature detonation, 
the target’s survival, or the community’s backlash.  The benefits could be incapacitating 
governments, defeating repression, killing a person or group, and/or publicizing their cause.  
Terrorists may also attempt to overthrow a government, such as bandits had done in China. 
                                                 
7  Simard, Kara “ Innocent at Guantanamo Bay: Granting Political Asylum to Unlawfully Detained Uighur 
Muslims.” Suffolk Transnational Law Review 30:2 (2007) 
8 Data acquired from RAND’s MIPT terrorism knowledgebase and the World Bank.  Data from 1995 to 2006 are 
utilized in this study. 
9 Cornish, D. B. C., Ronald V. "Modeling Offenders’ Decisions: A Framework for Research and Policy." An Annual 
Review of Research 6: 145-185, p.vi. (1985) 
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To illustrate the rationale of terrorists, Zwinkael recognized three characteristics of Al 
Qaeda that demonstrate a certain level of rationality.  First, all the operations by Al Qaeda 
exemplify “uniqueness”10 in that each attack is distinct from any other in history. Second, each 
attack strictly adhered to a timeline.  Third, Al Qaeda had defined goals.  Moreover, Zwikael 
applied a Project Management methodology to test terrorist events.  He found that 44 processes 
of project management were met in Al Qaeda operations.  Grouped into 9 categories, this list 
exemplifies the extensive planning needed for a successful attack11.  The categories are as 
follows: 
1. Integration. Includes integrative processes required to ensure that the various 
elements of the project are properly coordinated. 
2. Scope.  This knowledge area makes sure that the project includes all and only 
the necessary work required to complete the project successfully.  This knowledge 
area includes product scope (features and functions that are to be included in a 
product or service) and project scope (work that must be done in order to deliver a 
product as specified).  
3.  Time.  Scheduling is the process of integrating information regarding duration 
of activities, precedence relationships, and required due dates, in order to 
determine the dates in which resources are to perform the various activities that 
are part of the project. 
4.  Cost.  Processes include planning and controlling the project budget. 
5. Quality. Processes performed to reach the totality of features and characteristics 
of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy a customer’s given needs. 
6. Human resources.  Processes required making effective use of the people 
involved in the project, including organizational planning, staff acquisition, and 
team development. 
7. Communications.  The processes required in order to assure the timely and 
appropriate generation, collection, dissemination, storage, and ultimate 
disposition of project information.  This knowledge area includes communications 
planning, information distribution, performance reporting, and administrative 
closure.  
8. Risk management.  Processes dealing with identifying and reducing the 
project’s risk level, including risk management planning, risk identification, 
qualitative risk analysis, quantitative risk analysis, risk response planning, and 
risk monitoring and control. 
9.  Procurement.  Processes require the acquisition of goods and services from 
outside the performing organization.  This knowledge area includes: procurement 
                                                 
10 Zwinkael, O. "Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities." Comparative Politics 23(4): 423-438, p.268. (2007) 
11 Ibid. 
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planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract 
administration, and contract closeout12. 
The characteristics above give strong reasons to believe that Al Qaeda does act as rationally as 
any large corporation or business acts.  The fatwa of February 1998 stated that “it was God’s 
decree that every Muslim should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian, 
anywhere in the world, because of American occupation of Islam’s holy places and general 
aggression against Muslims”13.  This decree issued by Al Qaeda may seem irrational to the 
average American, but the steps to accomplish the fatwa are well developed.  In fact, operations 
are so well developed that from 1993 to 2005, a majority of Al Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. could 
be considered successful14. 
Crenshaw found that terrorists use “rational political choice”15.  The actions of terrorists 
are to gain “recognition or attention”16 for their cause.  Gruesome and horrific events bring the 
greatest attention and are therefore the tools of these actors.  Crenshaw found that when a small 
group is faced with a seemingly insurmountable task of challenging a large group or nation, 
terrorist tactics are logical choices17. 
Ferracuti 18  examines four theories to explain terrorism: frustration-aggression, 
unbalanced social systems, Olson’s rational choice, and Marxist theory.   Ferracuti does 
understand how logical actors could commit terrorist acts, yet he found that all four theories fall 
short of explaining terrorism.  Instead, he found that subculture theory holds the greatest 
explanatory power19.  Although Ferracuti does not support rational choice, he does explain how 
certain death can still be a rational choice for a terrorist.  It is understood that a human’s natural 
survival instinct would prohibit a person from putting himself in danger, but exceptions to this 
human drive may explain why terrorists logically kill others and themselves20.  Ferracuti states, 
“[d]eath per se cannot be accepted at the experimental level and must therefore be rationalized, 
attributed to chance or to natural processes, made into a symbol of an exceptional event, or 
denied and lived simply as a religious transition from life on earth to eternal life”21.  During 
times of war, a soldier can be encouraged to murder and understand that his or her life is in 
jeopardy.  A terrorist, therefore, creates these war conditions and subjects himself or herself to 
this rule.  No longer is the terrorist killing or being killed; instead he is part of a collective action 
against an enemy22.      
 Although this is by no means an exhaustive literature review of rational choice theory’s 
application to terrorism, it does provide evidence that the theory can be applied to terrorism.  To 
follow Ferracuti’s logic, a U.S. soldier would certainly not be considered irrational; therefore, 
                                                 
12 Ibid, p. 269. 
13 Ibid, p. 270. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Crenshaw, M. "The Causes of Terrorism." Comparative Politics 13(4): 379-399 (1981) 
16 Ibid, p.285. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ferracuti, F. "A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism." The Annals of the American Academy: 129-140. 
(1982) 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, p.136. 
22 Ibid. 
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terrorist actors may be rational as well.  Following Crenshaw’s23 findings, not only are the 
individual terrorist actors rational, but the group is as well because it is the only viable means of 
combating a superpower such as the United States.  Not only are the groups’ motivations 
rational, but the means they use are rationally executed24. 
 
Previous Research   
Previous empirical research has shaped the current study.  Davis 25  tests two major 
theories in terrorism research utilizing political, social and economic factors: social 
disorganization theory and relative deprivation theory.  Both theories hinge on rational choice 
theory’s postulates.   Davis argues that social disorganization will be positively related to societal 
change.  He operationalizes societal change using two variables GDP growth and population 
growth which estimate economic and social change, respectively.  These variables are expected 
to be positively related to political violence. Evidence supporting relative deprivation theory, 
Davis argues, is manifested when GDP per capita is regressed on political violence.  This 
relationship is not expected to be linear; instead, it was projected to have an inverted “U” shape.  
The logic for such a relationship is based on the argument of Gurr 26  and the findings of 
Feirabend and Feirabend27 who found that as moderate levels of GDP per capita are related to 
high political violence whereas low levels of political violence were associated with low and 
very high GDP per capita values.  As is necessary to test inverted “U” relationships, Davis 
utilized interaction variables to test relative deprivation theory.  Political rights squared, civil 
rights squared and democracy squared were used to test the hypothesis that repression and 
political rights share a negative parabolic curve.  In addition, variables calculated by squaring 
GDP per capita, education divided by GDP per capita, political rights multiplied by GDP per 
capita, and political rights multiplied by education further test relative deprivation theory. 
To test each theory Davis used count data of the number of assassinations per million per 
year in 138 nations over the course of 15 years (1970-1984), pooled and broken up into three 
time periods as a dependent variable.  Control variables of each nation included average 
education level, fraction of time (1960-1985) in war, participation in war (dummy), political 
rights, civil rights, democracy, government consumption, and government expenditures relative 
to GDP.   
 Models testing social disorganization theory found results contradictory to the theory.  
Yet models testing rational choice theory, a negative relationship between real GDP per capita 
growth and political violence, were significant.  In fact, when the dependent variable included all 
15 years, the p value was significant to the 1% level.  As predicted, results support an inverted 
“U”-shaped relationship between political violence and repression.  That is, political violence 
was low when repression was low and very high, but violence was greatest when repression was 
                                                 
23 Crenshaw, M. "The Causes of Terrorism." Comparative Politics 13(4): 379-399 (1981) 
24 Zwinkael, O. "Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities." Comparative Politics 23(4): 423-438. (2007) 
25 Davis, G. G. “Repression, Rationality, and Relative Deprivation; A Theoretical and Emperical Examination of 
Cross-National Variations in Political Violence”  Department of Economics Washington, D.C. , George Mason 
University Ph.D. : 1-31.(1999) 
26 Gurr, R. T. Why Men Rebel. (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970) 
27 Feirabend, R. & Feirabend, I. "Aggressive Behavior within Polities 1946-62 a Cross-National Study." Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 10: 249-271.(1966) 
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neither high nor low.  All models testing this relationship had a p value below 7%.  When all 
years were considered, the p-value was below the 0.1% level, indicating a very strong 
relationship28.  Overall, the study found support for the application for rational choice theory and 
relative deprivation theory.  Moreover, this study introduced variables that will be included in the 
current study.   
 Crain & Crain29 conducted a study in an effort to test the effect of terrorism on economic 
factors.  Data included indicators from 147 nations between the years of 1968 and 2002.  
Regressions used several dependent variables including GDP per capita, fixed capital 
investment, final consumption expenditures, and international tourist expenditures.  The 
independent variables were unanticipated incidents per 100,000 population, incidents per 
100,000, unanticipated casualties per 100,000, casualties per 100,000, unanticipated wounded 
per 100,000, wounded per 100,000, unanticipated killed per 100,000, and killed per 100,000.  All 
terrorist incident data were acquired through the ITERATE database.  Control variables were 
also included in a set of regressions.  They included infrastructure and economic indicators.  All 
independent variables were calculated using their natural log30.   
 The results found that terrorism is quite costly.  Consistently, unanticipated incidents per 
100,000 people were significant.  Most regressions found anticipated incidents per 100,000 
people were significant.  The impact on GDP was dramatic for some nations.  For instance, if the 
U.S. decreased the number of incidents from 3 to 2, the savings would be $40 billion.  Other 
nations would not see such a dramatic change.  For example, Argentina would save $257 million 
if terrorist incidents decreased from 11 to 10.  Interestingly, the change in cost from the number 
of incidents was not uniform.  For example, a population of 10 million that experiences a 
decrease in incidents from 2 to 1 will see a savings of $2.2 billion.  But if the same sized nation 
decreases the number of incidents from 10 to 9, the savings is only $330 million.  The population 
of the nation will also dictate the magnitude of the change in GDP.  The larger the nation, the 
greater the effect terrorism has on GDP31.  Crain & Crain offer valuable information about the 
relationship terrorism has on economic factors.  In particular, terrorist incidents play a role in a 
nation’s economic well being.  This study also introduces one particularly interesting control 
variable: telephone mainlines.  In every regression it was used, it was significant at the 1% 
level32, leading this researcher to consider this variable’s effect on a nation’s economy.    
 Abadie33 conducted a study to measure the effect economic, political, cultural/religious, 
and environmental variables have on the risk of terrorist attacks.  To accomplish this, Abadie 
(2004) utilized data from the World Market Research Center’s Global Terrorism Index which 
included information on 186 nations.  These data served as the dependent variable.  Notable 
independent variables included GDP per capita (log), lack of political rights, linguistic 
fractionalization, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, country’s land area, 
country’s elevation, and country’s tropical area.  Abadie chose political rights instead of civil 
                                                 
28 Davis, G. G.  “Repression, Rationality and Relative Deprivation” (1999) 
29 Crain, N. V. & Crain, W. M. "Terrorized Economies " Public Choice 128: 317-349. (2006) 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Abadie, A. “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism” Working Paper Series rwp04-043, Harvard 
University John F. Kennedy School of Government.(2004) 
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rights to reduce the endogeneity the variable would have on the risk of terrorism, i.e., a nation 
may constrict civil rights to deter terrorism. 
 Results of and ordinary least squares regression indicate that when the linguistic 
fractionalization variable is included, GDP per capita loses significance (negative correlation).  
Therefore, the commonly held belief that poor nations are more prone to terrorism is refuted in 
this study34.  In addition, all three environmental variables (land area, elevation, and tropical 
area) were significant, indicating that geographical conditions may lead to terrorist incident risk.  
Abadie found the relationship between terrorist risk and lack of political rights to increase until a 
moderate level of political rights is reached; then risk decreases.  This is in accordance with 
Davis’ (n.d.) findings.  Abadie’s use of environmental factors influences the current study.    
The following studies utilize similar dependent and independent variables.  The first, by 
Kurrild-Kiltgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen 35  consisted of four hypotheses expecting a 
negative relationship between terrorism incidents and economic freedom, political freedom, 
political rights, and civil liberties.   
 
Hypothesis 1:  Higher degrees of economic freedom lead to less terrorism 
Hypothesis 2:  Higher degrees of political freedom lead to less terrorism 
Hypothesis 3:  More extensive political rights lead to less terrorism  
Hypothesis 4:  More civil liberties lead to less terrorism  
 
 The researchers used a Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) design that spanned the years 
of 1996 and 2002.  Kurrild-Kiltgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen used ITERATE recorded 
terrorist incidents by origin nation and target nation as dependent variables.  Independent 
variables included political rights, civil rights, GDP per capita, economic growth, human 
poverty, and a set of control variables.  The dependent variable was coded as those nations that 
had experienced a terrorist incident and those that had not.  This variable served as the dependent 
dummy variable (1=nations having terrorist incidents, 0=nation that did not have terrorist 
incidents), therefore, a logistic regression model was utilized.  Independent variables were 
compiled from the Economic Freedom of the World Index and Freedom House.   
Kurrild-Kiltgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen found that negative quadratic form 
explained the relationship between terrorism and democracy (sig. at .01 level).  Therefore, 
nations having little democracy and those having the most democracy enjoyed fewer terrorist 
incidents, whereas, those that had a moderate amount of democracy faced a greater likelihood of 
a terrorist event.  Furthermore, a negative relationship was found between civil liberties and 
terrorist attacks.  Those nations that allowed greater amounts of civil liberties had a reduced 
likelihood of terrorism.  Results also discovered a negative relationship between trade orientation 
and terrorist events, as well as a positive relationship between linguistic fracturalization and 
terrorist acts. 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Kurrild-Kiltgaard, P., Justesen, M. K., and Klemmensen " The Political Economy of Freedom, Democracy, and 
Transnational Terrorism." Public Choice 128: 286-315.(2006) 
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Kurrild-Kiltgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen examined the origin of terrorist 
groups/individuals.  Utilizing the terrorist’s origin as a dependent variable, democracy was found 
to be a significant independent variable.  This relationship was negative and linear, i.e., nations 
that were more democratic had a lower likelihood of producing terrorists.  When control 
variables were added, civil liberty became significant and negatively related to nations 
experiencing terrorist incidents.  Essentially, democracy and civil liberty were found to be the 
strongest predictors of terrorist acts (whether victim or perpetrator).  Economic freedom was not 
significantly related to nations experiencing terrorist attacks or those in which the terrorists 
originated.  Utilizing many of the same independent variables, the current study attempts to test 
military force’s effect using more sophisticated models. 
Li conducted a study that also utilized time series analysis (TSCS) of terrorist incidents 
(ITERATE) from 1975 to 1997 from 119 nations.  Three hypotheses are tested and are as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Greater democratic participation reduces the number of 
transnational terrorist incidents in a country. 
Hypothesis 2: Countries with more institutional constraints on their government 
experience more transnational terrorist incidents. 
Hypothesis 3: Democratic countries with the proportional system have fewer 
transnational terrorist incidents than those with the majoritarian or mixed 
systems36.   
 
As mentioned, the dependent variable was terrorist incidents.  The independent variables 
included freedom of press, democratic participation (dummy), government power constraint, 
proportional government, regime durability [“number of years since most recent regime 
change”37], past incidents (average number of incidents since 1968), and post-cold war (if nation 
arose after the cold war).  Also included were controls for regions, government size, and conflict 
(if nation was involved in a conflict). 
 Results indicated that democratic participation reduces terrorist incidents and government 
constraints increase the likelihood for terrorist incidents.  Li concludes by stating that “improving 
citizen satisfaction, electoral participation, and political efficacy, democratic governments can 
reduce the number of terrorist incidents within their borders”38.  Of interest to this study is, of 
course, the major finding as reported, but also the use of proportional dummy variables.  The 
suspected negative effect of a proportional system was not found in any of the models tested.  In 
one of two models majoritarian and mixed systems were found to have a positive effect on 
terrorist incidents.   
 
Research Design: Measures, Data, and Methods 
                                                 
36 Li, Q. "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 
49(2): 1-20.(2005) 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, p.17. 
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 Similar to Li’s study, the current study utilizes the number of terrorist incidents per 
country per year in 166 nations between the years of 1995 and 2006 as the dependent variable.  
Li addressed the use of count data by arguing that such data does not take into account the 
magnitude of the incident.  That is, a terrorist incident that kills 30 people would be considered 
the same as an incident that does not kill one person39.  Such a consideration would seriously 
threaten internal validity if the magnitude were related to the independent variables and the 
purpose of the analysis.  In this case, the magnitude is not central to the argument, instead, it is 
the fact that the individual or group planned and executed the terrorist event.  From a deterrence 
standpoint, the fact that the terrorist(s) conspired to commit the attack is of concern.  Economic, 
political, and social factors should have prevented a person from feeling that such behavior was 
necessary.  In addition, the ubiquitous nature of “military might” should have dissuaded the 
perpetrator or group from following through with the plan.  This analysis goes beyond the 
“symptoms” of terrorism by trying to measure the source of terrorist drives.  Therefore, treating 
all incidents as equivalent may be considered the best method to ascertain the source of terrorist 
drives.  According to University of Maryland’s START program, 97% of terrorist incidents are 
domestic40.  Therefore, aggregate analysis of this kind can, for the most part, accurately estimate 
the effect of economic, political and social factors on terrorism.  In addition, military force is 
largely domestic with only a few exceptions; for example the coordinated effort in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  In essence, only a small fraction of nations possess the ability to substantially fight 
terrorism abroad.   
The current study introduces military force to determine if it does prevent terrorist events.  
Testing such a proposition may seem problematic because determining causation is difficult.  In 
addition, nations who dedicate military resources to terrorism innately have an interest in 
deterring terrorists.  Therefore, events that occur on their soil may have occurred regardless of 
military efforts.  Furthermore, military force may decrease terrorism for a nation that otherwise 
would have many more incidents.  Admittedly, these relationships complicate the current study, 
but each will be addressed and mitigated as much as possible. 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 In accordance with the aforementioned literature, the following research question and 
hypotheses have been established.  
Research Question:  Can the economic, social and political institutions affect the likelihood of a 
terrorist event in a nation? 
Hypothesis 1: Nations that enjoy more economic freedoms will be less likely to fall victim to 
terrorist incidents. 
Hypothesis 2: Nations that enjoy more political freedoms will be less likely to fall victim to 
terrorist incidents. 
Hypothesis 3: A state’s military spending will have a negative effect on terrorism incidents in 
that respective state. 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 START, University of Maryland’s terrorism database 
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Hypothesis 4: The magnitude of a state’s military workforce is negatively related to the number 
of terrorist incidents   
Hypothesis 5: Nations having a majoritarian or mixed political system will be positively related 
to the number of terrorist incidents  
 
Data 
This study will use count data of terrorist incidents for the years including and between 
1995 and 2006 gathered from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base41.  For instance, in FY 2000, 
Ecuador experienced five terrorist incidents.  Therefore, Ecuador is given a five in 2000.  To 
avoid auto-correlation, the time series data will include a trend variable.  Using count data 
precludes the use of OLS because a great number of nations did not experience terrorist 
incidents.  For example, China did not experience any terrorist incidents 4 out of 12 years.  
Furthermore, the data is not parametric nor are the conditional means and variances equal as a 
Poisson model assumes.  Therefore, a time series Negative Binomial Regression Model 
(XTNBRM) is utilized.   
 
Definition 
A major concern when dealing with terrorism data is the definition applied to an incident.  
The FBI, State Department, and CIA all have different definitions.  Using a singular definition 
can be considered a strength as well as a weakness.  Certain incidents may not fit the needed 
parameters, yet they are considered by many to be terrorism.  On the other hand, an innocuous 
incident may be considered terrorism even though it may seem ridiculous to be considered as 
such.  The data utilized in this study does not have a set definition.  Instead MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base used several configurable definitions of terrorist.  This approach is ambiguous 
but is likely to be one of the most liberal.  It is necessary to mention that one should not consider 
these data to be completely accurate but rather a close approximation of the number of incidents.  
Data from any source of this kind will most likely be inaccurate because the chain of events that 
must occur to have an incident added to this list is daunting at times.  Incidents such as 9/11 will 
easily make the list, but incidents that are in remote areas, affected few people, and did not result 
in fatalities will most likely be neglected.   Yet this data does provide valuable information that 
represents terrorism in many regions of the world; even if the count is not correct, the magnitude 
still reflects the degree of terrorism.  In addition, the error is considered to be close to equivalent 
in most nations, therefore the data are still reliable because the error is distributed evenly 
throughout.  Furthermore, this type of data are considered one of the most accurate non-classified 
sources. 
To measure military force several variables will be introduced into the regression.  The 
following will operationalize the variable: military expenditures as a percentage of central 
government spending, military spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
military personnel as a percentage of labor force, and total military personnel.  Data for this 
variable was gathered from the World Bank42.  Although data from this report are valuable, some 
                                                 
41 RAND’s MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase 
42 The World Bank Database 
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variables may be considered problematic under this type of examination because not all military 
funds are directed toward counter-terrorism.  Yet attaining a figure that could accurately measure 
counter-terrorism spending would be equally problematic.  For instance, in the United States 
many agencies, including Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations, 
Central Intelligence Agency, and many others, participate in conjunction with and independently 
from the U.S. military to prevent terrorist events.  Finding accurate counter-terrorism figures in 
an immensely bureaucratic nation such as the U.S. is difficult, but the data become increasingly 
more difficult in less bureaucratic and less organized nations such as Zimbabwe.  Therefore, the 
percentage of GDP dedicated to military spending and military expenditures as a percentage of 
central government expenditures should be considered more as an indicator of counter-terrorism 
spending than as an exact figure.  Furthermore, in effort to neutralize the disparity of spending 
between first world and third world nations, military expenditures are held respective to GDP 
and central government spending.  For example, the United States spent approximately 
$348,500,000 in military expenditures in 2004; meanwhile, Israel spent a seemingly dismal 
$9,900,000 in the same year43.  When the percentage of GDP spent on military expenditures is 
evaluated, it becomes apparent that Israel (9.7%) put more of their potential resources toward 
military spending; in fact, nearly three times as much of their GDP as the United States (3.3%).  
Interestedly, China spent approximately the same as the U.S. when spending is held respective of 
GDP, 2.7%, but in a standardized currency value44 China spent only 2.2% of what the U.S. 
spent45.   
In addition, several variables were gathered from the Heritage Foundation Freedom 
index46.  Those included are democracy score, business freedom, trade freedom, government 
size, monetary freedom, fiscal freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, 
freedom from corruption, and labor freedom.  Several other variables were gathered from World 
Bank 47 .  These variables include GDP growth, internet users per 100 people, labor force 
participation (%), life expectancy rate, mobile users per 100 people, the social contribution as a 
percentage of government revenue, and total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.  Two notable 
controls are mobile phone and internet users.  Crain & Crain used telephone mainlines as a 
control48.  Thus, this study will utilize internet and mobile phone user variables in an attempt to 
ascertain the connectivity of a nation with itself and the rest of the world.  A control of this type 
should account for a nation’s technological prowess and, is therefore, a valuable control in 
today’s world.   
A variable for political representation has also been added.  Proportional representation 
(PR) systems have been regarded as more stable than mixed or majoritarian systems because 
they allow societies having more fractionalization to be more accurately represented in their 
government49.  If this is true, political groups in non-PR systems may not be able to represent the 
variety of perspectives available in their society.  This frustration may lead to groups becoming 
                                                 
43 Chamberlin, J.” Comparisons of U.S. and Foreign Military Spending: Data from Selected Public Sources,” 
Congressional Research Service 1-27.(2004) 
44 Based on 2004 U.S. dollars 
45 Ibid 
46 The Freedom House organization; www.freedomhouse.org 
47 The World Bank organization 
48 Crain, N. V. & Crain, W. M. "Terrorized Economies" Public Choice 128: 317-349.(2006) 
49 Lijphart, A. Patterns of Democracy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999) 
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deviant terrorist groups.  Li found that PR systems did not have a significant (positive or 
negative) effect on terrorist incidents, but he did find a significant positive relationship between 
mixed and majoritarian systems on such incidents.  Therefore, in an effort to test Li’s (2005) 
findings, which included incidents from 1975 to 1997, the current study will include a dummy 
variable for mixed or majoritarian systems.    
The following analysis also includes a control variable for each of the 166 nations 
measured in an effort to limit the effects of certain regions’ terrorist incidents, but most will drop 
out due to collinearity.  That is, due to the other control variables, these nation control variables 
will drop out of the regression.  The strength of the other control variables is negatively related to 
the number of nation control variables.  Table 1 represents the descriptive statistics for the 
aforementioned independent and dependent variables.   
 
Table 1: Descriptive 
statistics______________________________________________________ 
     N Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Terrorist incidents    1980    9.915657     108.7231           0       3968 
Military Spending as % of GPD  1673 2.306515 1.882327 0       14.62 
Military Spending as % of Total   
Government Expenditures  893 9.486954 7.851437 0       52.99 
Military Personnel as % of Total 
Labor     1884    1.730663     1.907425         0       12.96 
Military Personnel    1897    193977.4     466947.6         0       5564000 
Military Personnel (log)   1887    10.70527     1.841411        4.60    15.53183 
Democracy     1807    58.45977     12.22915          4       90.5 
Business Freedom    1807     64.0399     14.41582          0        100  
Trade Freedom     1807    62.26209      17.3811         -20         90 
Fiscal Freedom    1807    68.42928     16.59099          0        99.9 
Government Size   1807    65.41942     25.12799          0        99.3 
Monetary Freedom    1807    70.28019     20.44035          0        95.4 
Investment Freedom    1807    53.44217     19.09047         10         90  
Financial Freedom   1807    50.71389     20.78177         10         90 
Property Rights    1807    51.13448     23.70189         10         90 
Freedom from Corruption   1807     40.0321     24.75267          4        100 
GDP Growth    1903    4.371597     5.506038       -41.3       85.9  
Internet Users per 100   1882    9.635659     15.53442          0          85.65 
Life Expectancy    1291    68.55324     10.46541       31.08      82.32 
Mobile Users per 100   1957    21.57189     30.41572          0        139.01  
Population 14 or younger (%)  1973    31.47396     10.48343      13.57      51.16   
Population Growth   1973    188.8121     685.0028       1.45    6580.71 
Population Density    1972    1.436922     1.277803      -5.14         9.76  
Governmental Social Contribution  696     20.7182     15.14373          0         60.23 
Mixed or Majoritarian (dummy)  1980    .7262626     .4459884          0           1 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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According to the data, China experienced a mean of 1.58 terrorist incidents per year with 
a standard deviation of 1.83 incidents between 1995 and 2006.  The average number of fatalities 
was 7.25 (standard deviation of 24) and the mean number of injuries was 3.25 (standard 
deviation of 9).  China spent an average of $28.9 million50 and boasted a military composed of 
3.6 to 4.1 million personnel during any given year.  China scored above the worldwide 12 year 
mean in monetary freedom, government size, and fiscal freedom.  Freedom House reported low 
scores for China in investment freedom, financial freedom, and property rights.  Their average 
GDP growth was an outstanding 9.46%; over 5% above the 12 year worldwide average.  The 
Chinese enjoyed a life expectancy 2 years above the worldwide mean.  On average, 13 out of 
100 citizens had a mobile phone and about 4 out of 100 were utilizing the internet; both are 
below the worldwide mean for the 12 year timeframe. 
 
Empirical Results 
 Tables 2 through 5 display the regression results.  Fifteen models are included differing 
by the use of fixed effects and the time frame analyzed.  Models 1 though 7 include data from all 
years, models 8 through 11 include data from 1995 to 2000, and models 8 to 15 include the data 
from years 2001 to 2006.  Fixed effect variables for nation and year were done separately 
because when done in conjunction with one another, regression results were not possible. 
Model 1 includes all social, economic, and political independent variables.  In addition, 
military might was measured in military expenditures as a percentage of GDP.  Regression 
results indicate only overall democracy increased the likelihood of terrorist incidents.  In time 
periods spanning 1995 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006, the coefficients indicate that there is a slightly 
better than 50/50 chance of a terrorist incident when democracy increases by one unit.  
Regressions in which democracy was expected to have an inverted “u” shape did not increase 
goodness of fit values; therefore the better fitting linear model is reported.  Most economic 
indicators found a negative effect.  That is, as nations increased in business, fiscal, monetary, 
investment, and financial freedoms, fewer terrorist incidents took place in that nation.  
Furthermore, political factors including property rights and freedom from corruption also 
diminished the number of terrorist incidents.  Mixed and majoritarian governmental systems did 
not experience an increased likelihood of attack.  In fact, their coefficient is negative, indicating 
a slight inverse relationship.  However, this variable is not significant.  Military might, measured 
by military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, was insignificant.  Model 2 is similar to model 
1 except it does not include any fixed effects.  This model is used as a comparison to other 
models using fixed effects.   
 Model 3 replaces model 1’s measure of military might with military expenditures as a 
percentage of total government spending.  In this model, military might is significant at the 10% 
level.  The relationship is positive, indicating that as military expenditures increase, terrorist 
events increase as well; a causational relationship is unable to be established.  Model 4 replaces 
the fixed effects by nation with fixed effects by year.  The year 2000 was omitted and is 
therefore used as the reference year.  The year 2000 was chosen because it stands in the middle 
of the time frame, yet is before the historic year 2001.  Therefore, the year 2000 would have 
characteristics of 1995 and of 2006 but without the distortion caused by the terrorist events of  
                                                 
50 Based on the 2004 U.S. dollar 
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2001.  These variables attempt to negate the effect that omitted variables specific to the year may 
introduce.  The results are similar to those of model 1, in which political and economic 
institutions have a negative effect.  However, the strength of the relationships has diminished 
slightly.  Again, representation type and military might (measured as expenditures per GDP) 
were not significant.   
Model 5 is similar to model 4 except the measure of military might is military 
expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures.  The results indicate that when 
years are used as fixed effects, military might is not significant.  Model 6 changes the measure of 
military might again by utilizing data indicating the number of military personnel as a percentage 
of the total labor force.  Again, when the fixed effects for years are included, military might is 
not significant.  Model 7 includes a different measure of military might: the natural log of the 
total number of military personnel.  In this regression, military might is strongly and positively 
significant (p<.001).  The natural log form was used to reduce the amount of dispersion. 
Table 3 represents regressions using data from only the years between 1995 and 2000.  
This set was selected because it should not include the effects of 9/11 and subsequent defensive 
and offensive strategies by nations and by terrorist groups.  In all models the use of fixed effects 
is relegated only to year variables; nation variable fixed effects were not possible.  Model 8 finds 
that military might as measured by expenditures as a percentage of GDP is significant.  Again, 
this relationship is positive and the coefficient indicates a probability greater than 50/50 of a 
terrorist event occurring when military expenditures as a percentage of GDP increase by one 
percentage.  In all four models analyzing data between 1995 and 2000, mixed and majoritarian 
government systems were positive and significant (p<.05).  That is, government systems that 
were not a pure parliamentary system were victim to more terrorist incidents.   
Interestingly, the control variables of internet and mobile phone users per 100 people 
were negative and strongly significant.  Considering the years between 1995 and 2000, this 
should be expected since internet and mobile phone use were not as prolific as they are today.  
This may be a good indicator of a nations’ technological advancement.  Therefore, 
technologically savvy nations experienced fewer terrorist incidents than their non-
technologically advanced counterparts. Models 9, 10, and 11 differ only in the manner they 
measure military might.  Significance was found in two out of the three models.  Only the 
variable that operationalized military might as military personnel in respect to the total 
workforce is insignificant.  Therefore, between the years of 1995 and 2000, military might and 
terrorist events most likely shared a positive relationship. 
Models 12, 13, 14, and 15 utilize data from the years between 2001 and 2006.  Again, 
only the fixed effects for years were utilized and, in these models, the year 2001 was used as the 
comparison year.  All four models found a negative relationship between government social 
contribution and terrorist events.  Model 12 indicates that economic factors including business 
(p<.05), investment (p<.10), financial (p<.01), and GDP growth (p<.001) have a negative 
relationship with terrorist incidents.  The only political factor significant was freedom from 
corruption and, as expected, the relationship is negative.  Military might, measured by military 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, was not significant in this regression.  Model 13 utilizes 
military expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures to depict military might, 
and again the relationship is not significant.  Model 14 changes the measure of military might 
again, but when military personnel as a percentage of total workforce is utilized, the relationship 
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is significant and positive.  Finally, model 15 finds a strong (p<.001) positive relationship 
between military might, as measured by the natural log of total military personnel, and terrorist 
incidents.  In fact, according to the coefficient, if the log of military personnel increases by one, 
the chance of a terrorist incident is almost twice as likely. 
 
Findings 
 All hypotheses and the research question are addressed in this section. 
Hypothesis 1: Nations that enjoy more economic freedoms will be less likely to fall victim to 
terrorist incidents. 
Nations that had greater business, investment, and trade freedoms had fewer terrorist 
incidents.  In most regressions, GDP growth had an inverse relationship with terrorist events.  In 
particular, the years after 2000 found a very strong relationship (p<.01) between GDP growth 
and terrorist incidents.  This may indicate that as we further the degree of globalization, tensions 
may rise for those nations that are not progressing as quickly as others.  One may conclude that 
terrorists may feel a sense of relative deprivation.  This conclusion is further emphasized when 
the other economic indicators are considered.  These finding suggest that economic freedoms 
should be encouraged. 
Hypothesis 2: Nations that enjoy more political freedoms will be less likely to fall victim to 
terrorist incidents. 
The degree of democracy, corruption, and property rights has influenced terrorist 
incidents in varying degrees since 1995.  Results considering the years of and between 1995 and 
2006 prove that the overall democracy of a nation is positively related to number of terrorist 
incidents in that nation.  This finding is in accordance with previous research.  The extent of 
corruption is also strongly related to terrorist activity.  Often, nations having less corrupt 
governments will be rewarded with fewer terrorist incidents.  Property rights may be considered 
either political or economic.  One may argue that the government offers property rights to 
citizens either via legislation or judicial decision.  In analyses considering all twelve years, those 
nations that allowed greater property rights also enjoyed fewer terrorist incidents.  Overall, 
political freedoms play a strong role in deterring terrorist incidents, but democracy seems to 
encourage terrorism.  It should be remembered that these analyses utilize the target nation’s 
terrorist incidents and not the nation that is the origin of the terrorist.  Therefore, more 
democratic nations may be targeted by terrorists.  This conclusion is supported by Pape51 who 
analyzed suicide terrorism.  He argues that democratic nations concede to the wishes of terrorists 
more easily than do non-democratic nations.  The findings of this study furthers Pape’s argument 
by indicating that, more so than just being democratic, nations that have a higher level of 
democracy will face a greater likelihood of victimization by terrorists. 
Hypothesis 3: A state’s military spending will have a negative effect on terrorism incidents in 
that respective state. 
 Two indicators are used to measure military spending: military expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP and as a percentage of total government expenditures.  Both measures only 
                                                 
51 Pape, R.  "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." The American Political Science Review 97(3): 343-
361.(2003)  
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found significance (p<.05 in both measures) in a positive direction in analyses considering the 
years between 1995 and 2000.  One may conclude that since 2001, military intervention has been 
more effective than in the past, but its effect does not reduce the number of terrorist incidents.  
This is contrary to the notions of many politicians and American citizens. 
Hypothesis 4: The magnitude of a state’s military workforce is negatively related to the number 
of terrorist incidents 
 Military might is operationalized by using two personnel indicators: military personnel as 
a percentage of total labor force and the natural log of military personnel.  Results indicate that 
the natural log of military personnel is very positively and significantly (p<.001) related to 
terrorist incidents.  When the years between 2001 and 2006 are considered, military personnel as 
a percentage of total labor force found a positive and significant (p<.05) relationship with 
terrorist incidents.  These results indicate that military force increases the chance of terrorist 
incidents.  Although the military may enhance security, they induce a greater number of terrorist 
events.     
Hypothesis 5: Nations having a majoritarian or mixed political system will be positively related 
to the number of terrorist incidents 
 Pure parliamentary systems between 1995 and 2000 enjoyed fewer incidents.  As 
Lijphart52 argues, parliamentary systems may have offered adequate representation and, thereby, 
stability.  Unfortunately, this finding is relegated only to the years of 1995 to 2000.  All other 
analyses indicated that representation did not reduce the number of terrorist events.  One may 
conclude that the years after 2001 experienced a greater terrorist force that overcame any 
stabilizing effects that pure parliamentary systems offered.    
Research Question:  Can the economic, social and political institutions affect the likelihood of a 
terrorist event in a nation? 
The frequency of terrorist incidents is strongly related to political and economic 
institutions.  Political factors constitute a significant portion of a nation’s political institutions.  
Stronger political institutions will, most likely, result in fewer terrorist events and, in a more 
general sense, offer citizens a stable government and society.  But government alone cannot 
reduce terrorist incidents.  Economic institutions are vital for a society.  The analysis of this and 
other research studies prove that this is true.       
In addition to the economic and political institutions, social institutions should also be 
recognized.  In an effort to quantify the social institutions in a nation, government’s social 
contribution was included as a variable.  This monetary indicator found significance between the 
years of 2001 and 2006, indicating that the government’s ability to help solve social problems is 
becoming more crucial in a post-9/11 world.  But social institutions include more than merely 
government welfare programs.  The culture and social dynamics of a nation are encapsulated in 
social institutions.  Therefore, social institutions affect the financial and political environment of 
nation.  Societies having social institutions that regard economic and political freedoms should 
enjoy fewer terrorist incidents.  Military might in its various forms of measurement was found 
counter-productive, which exemplifies the crucial role of institutions.  Moreover, the effects of 
                                                 
52 Lijphart, A. Patterns of Democracy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999) 
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political, economic and social institutions are not mutually exclusive; instead they are 
intertwined.  Therefore, effective policy must address all three institutions.  
 
Limitations 
  The current study has several limitations that should be addressed in future research.  
First is the imprecision of data sources.  The dependent variable, terrorist incidents by nation per 
year, was acquired from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base53.  The database does not include all 
terrorist incidents, only those that were reported by media outlets.  Some incidents did not get 
media attention and were therefore omitted.  This non-random measurement error should be 
congruent throughout, but future research should attempt to gain more accurate records.   
 Independent variables acquired from Freedom House54 can be flawed since evaluations 
that create the index are subjective.  Although Freedom House prides itself on methodological 
techniques, in essence these measures are questionable.  Currently, Freedom House is one of the 
most widely used sources of political data, but future research should attempt to find more 
objective instruments.   
 This study utilized data from 1995 to 2006, a twelve year period involving 1,980 
observations from 165 nations.  Although the analysis includes a significant period of time, the 
indicators utilized in this study should be applied to larger time periods to gain a better 
perspective on terrorism.  That is, if political, economic, and social factors impact terrorist 
events, they should do so in any time period.  Ideally, researchers should attempt to include a 
time period greater than three decades.  Yet, the greatest obstacle is gaining trustworthy data 
from all nations over this time frame.     
 
Policy Implications and Conclusion 
 In general, policies should seek more effective government, free economic markets, and 
encourage a society to become stable.  Considering the vast array of government types and 
cultures of the 165 nations analyzed in this study, the aforementioned goals will be formidable.  
The answer may lie in custom tailored policy devised by each nation.  The U.S. has an incentive 
to encourage nations to be democratic and capitalistic, yet depending on culture and existing 
economic conditions, this type of policy may be detrimental.  Developing and developed nations 
should differ in policy initiatives.  Developing nations should put greater resources into 
eliminating corruption and harnessing the people’s trust.  They should balance their economic 
growth with policy regulating oppressive business practices.  These nations should seek U.N. 
coordination to assist in creating and implementing progressive policies.  
  Developed nations, such as China, should seek to reduce any existing corruption and 
encourage greater civic participation.  Economic practices should be evaluated and unnecessary 
regulations that stifle growth should be removed; although, trust in the invisible hand should be 
tempered with caution.  Governmental leaders should strive to inculcate a culture that embodies 
the government’s effectiveness.  To accomplish this, policies should reflect the will of the 
people.  Legislators, judges and executive leaders should put their own agendas aside for the 
                                                 
53 RAND’s MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase 
54 The Freedom House organization; www.freedomhouse.org 
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greater good.  It is with societal stability that terrorism will be controlled; this conclusion is 
evident in this study’s results. 
In more democratic nations security is critical.  Resources should be devoted to target 
hardening and border security.  The tradeoff between civil liberties and security should be 
considered when adjusting security regulations.  In a broad sense, the benefit from security 
should not exceed the cost to society.  This is a difficult equilibrium to establish.  The optimum 
level of security will not offer absolute protection.  In fact, absolute security would be much too 
costly and infeasible.  Allowing feedback from the public and accepting that some terrorist 
incidents will occur should assist in determining this point.   
 In conclusion, terrorist activity can be controlled and possibly eliminated if political, 
economic, and social conditions are correct.  Terrorism is not the disease; merely a symptom.  
More secure buildings, airports, and borders only assist in preventing terrorism and have the 
potential of causing more harm than good.  In accordance with security, policies should focus on 
preventing a belief that terrorism is a viable answer to changing a government or ideology.  To 
accomplish this, the institutions of a society must be addressed.  Foreign influence is likely to 
have unfavorable outcomes but may be necessary in extreme circumstances in an effort to regain 
control.  Garth Evans55 of the Crisis Group offers 8 suggestions to all nations aspiring to reduce 
terrorism. 
 
1)  “The best way to prevent deadly conflict is not to start one:”  Military 
intervention should be avoided and used only as a last resort. 
2)  “Conflict prevention effort does make a difference:”  The use of international 
governmental and economic institutions, such as the UN, can offer productive 
assistance to embattled nations. 
3)  “One size analysis doesn’t fit all- every conflict is different:”  Overarching 
theories do not reflect the conflict; instead comprehensively understanding the 
dynamics in each nation is necessary in effective policy changes.   
4)  “Conflict is cyclical- the trick is to stop the wheel turning:”  Institutions 
should be created and designed to assist a nation in addressing post-conflict 
disagreements non-violently.  
5)  “Conflict prevention requires complex strategies- one dimensional fixes rarely 
work:”  Managing conflicts requires an in-depth knowledge of a nation’s complex 
dynamics; therefore, policy should address the many aspects involved. 
6)  “Conflict prevention requires effective institutional structures:”  Global, 
regional and national governments should focus on conflict prevention. 
7)  “Conflict prevention requires application of resources:”  Resources (monetary 
and human) should be allotted effectively and efficiently in an effort to promote 
stability. 
                                                 
55 Evans, G. "Conflict Prevention and the EU: Setting the Scene "   Retrieved Oct 1, 2008, from 
www.crisisgroup.org, p.1-6.(2008) 
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8)  “Conflict prevention requires political will:”  The nation’s government and 
leaders must embody a conflict prevention stance.    
 
His advice is supported by the findings of this study and offers an excellent vision for future 
foreign and domestic policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
